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Were Nietzsche’s Cardinal Ideas – Delusions? 
 
by Eva M. Cybulska 
 
 
Even as ‘a philosopher’ I still did not express my essential thoughts (or ‘delusions’). 





Nietzsche’s cardinal ideas - God is Dead, Übermensch and Eternal Return of the Same - are 
approached here from the perspective of psychiatric phenomenology rather than that of 
philosophy. A revised diagnosis of the philosopher’s mental illness as manic-depressive psychosis 
forms the premise for discussion. Nietzsche conceived the above thoughts in close proximity to his 
first manic psychotic episode, in the summer of 1881, while staying in Sils-Maria (Swiss Alps). It 
was the anniversary of his father’s death, and also of the break-up of his friendship with Wagner, 
the most important relationship in his life. Despite having been acquainted with these ideas from 
reading philosophy and literature, Nietzsche created them de novo and imbued them with very 
personal meaning. Surprisingly, he never defined or explained his cardinal thoughts in his 
published writings, perhaps because rationally he could not. A resultant hermeneutic vacuum 
provoked an avalanche of interpretations in secondary literature. But could these ideas be 
delusions? A current definition of delusion is challenged, and an attempt is made at a limited 
comparison between delusion, scientific/philosophical doctrine and poetic creation. It is also 
argued that psychosis is a way of re-living trauma, and delusions can therefore be seen as a form 
of reasoning that helps to make sense of the world in a state of psychotic disintegration. Far from 
being false beliefs, delusions are a true expression of one’s innermost feelings and pain, albeit 
indirectly. The relationship between early parental loss and repeated trauma, psychosis and 
creativity is also explored.  
       
 
 
Recent research increasingly suggests that the original 
diagnosis of Nietzsche’s mental illness as tertiary 
syphilis is untenable. Instead, it is proposed that 
throughout his creative life the philosopher suffered 
from a cyclic mood disorder, at times of psychotic 
intensity (Cybulska, 1998, 2000a; Rogé, 1999; 
Schain, 2001). This revised diagnosis may throw new 
light on Nietzsche’s creativity and have a 
considerable impact on the interpretation of his 
philosophy. An aphoristic style, an abundance of 
contradictions, an extraordinary imagistic vividness 
and musicality, as well as the highly compelling 
nature of his writings may have been rooted in his 
protean affective states with oscillating boundaries 
between what normally is, and is not, conscious, real 
and rational. 
  
This is an attempt to look at Nietzsche’s cardinal 
ideas – God is Dead, Übermensch and Eternal Return 
of the Same – from a perspective of psychiatric 
phenomenology rather than that of philosophy. He 
never defined or explained them, and a resultant 
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hermeneutic vacuum provoked an avalanche of 
interpretations in secondary literature. God is dead 
has been interpreted as an apocalyptic vision of 
mankind after the demise of religion (Kaufmann, 
1974), a manifesto of nihilism (Danto, 1965) or a 
statement of existential aloneness (Heidegger, 1977). 
Hollingdale (1999) saw in Übermensch a man who 
had organised the chaos within, Kaufmann (1974) a 
symbol of man that created his own values, and Jung 
(1934-39/1989) saw a new ‘God’. For Heidegger 
(1954/1984) it stood for humanity that surpassed 
itself, and for the Nazis it became an emblem of the 
master race. Eternal Return – which Nietzsche called 
his “most scientific idea” – was interpreted by 
Heidegger (1954/1984) as existential choice; for 
Deleuze (1994) it was a ‘mystical game of loss and 
salvation’ with a ring of Kantian categorical 
imperative; Wood (1988) read the doctrine as a 
deconstructive transvaluation of time. The question 
arises: were these ideas scientific concepts, 
philosophical doctrines, poetic creations or delusional 
phenomena?  
                                                       
General Considerations 
 
It is the value of all morbid states that they 
show us under a magnifying glass certain 
states that are normal – but not easily 
visible when normal. (Nietzsche, The Will 
to Power) 
 
The current definition of delusion can be traced back to 
Jaspers (1913/1962) whose famous three ‘criteria’ – 
falsity, certainty and incorrigibility – form its core. In 
the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) 
it is defined as “a false personal belief based on 
incorrect inference about external reality and firmly 
sustained in spite of what almost everyone believes, and 
in spite of what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious 
proof or evidence to the contrary. The belief is not one 
normally accepted by other members of the person’s 
culture or subculture (e.g. religious faith)”. A challenge 
to this definition, as well as a limited comparison 
between delusion, scientific enlightenment and poetic 
creation, is attempted below.  
 
Belief versus Judgement 
The definition of delusion as a false belief is 
inaccurate. Spitzer (1990) proposed a term 
‘knowledge claims’, and much earlier Jaspers 
(1913/1962) considered delusion to be a ‘mistaken 
judgement’. Anthony Kenny (2007) has pointed out 
that “belief is a disposition expressed in acts of 
judgement”. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary (2006), “A belief is a feeling that 
something is real or true, trust, confidence” (p. 61), 
and, as a feeling is bound to be true (unless one is 
lying), only opinion or judgement about reality can be 
true or false. Judgement is based on probabilities, 
involves weighing evidence, and implies conscious 
deliberation and choice, usually after a period of 
suspension. Belief is a statement of faith, and 
therefore the dichotomy of truth and falsity cannot 
apply. Could it be more appropriate to define delusion 
as a belief that parades as judgement? 
 
Truth versus Falsity 
The most controversial is the relationship between 
delusion and truth. Jaspers (1913/1962) famously stated 
that “in the case of delusion, we may see someone 
irretrievably lost in untruth” (p. 411). Etymologically 
‘truth’ derives from the Old English trēow (loyalty, 
fidelity, faith) – with the German word wahr having 
similar etymological roots – as in contrast to ‘reality’, 
which derives from the Latin rēs (thing, matter), that 
which exists independently (Partridge, 1963, p. 740). 
‘Reason’ and ‘reality’ share the stem rēs, hence 
Hegel’s observation that the real is the rational and 
the rational is the real. For Kierkegaard (1846/1968) 
truth was subjectivity, and it was related to existential 
inwardness. Perhaps delusion is best viewed not as a 
predicative statement about external reality, but as an 
uncompromising expression of the innermost self; an 
expression of a private passion, the intensity of which 
cannot be doubted. Also, to paraphrase Nietzsche, 
delusion expresses the truth that otherwise would 
have become poisonous. As delusion truly conveys 
the state of the inner world (the state of inwardness), 
is it not truer than a scientific judgement that only 
approximates reality?  
Doubt versus Certainty          
Since the time of Descartes, the path to knowledge 
has been described as running via doubt and 
uncertainty. Doubt may serve as an inhibitor of an 
immediate response, and also as a stimulus towards 
refutation/verification. Popper (1935/1959) rotated a 
Verification Principle into a Falsification Principle, 
stating that the progress of science was achieved not 
by an effort to confirm the hypothesis, but precisely 
by the opposite manoeuvre – by an attempt to refute 
it. This mechanism of ‘falsification’ is certainly 
lacking in a delusion formation; it is of no concern to 
the artist/poet. An attempt at refutation/verification 
becomes not just a search for proof, but also a quest 
to retrace the trajectory of the imaginative leap.  
 
A scientific illumination often carries a feeling of 
profound certainty (as described by Poincaré and quoted 
by Eysenck, 1994), and also (unlike delusion) it brings a 
sense of achievement and pleasure. It is presumably 
because scientific investigation is primarily curiosity-
driven, and to satisfy curiosity is amongst the greatest of 
human pleasures. 
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Perseveration or Incorrigibility?  
As delusion is not a result of a conscious choice 
between several options, one could look at it as an 
involuntary thought that repeats itself, a kind of 
perseveration. Kraepelin (1913/1921) already observed 
that, in mania, delusions once formed return with a 
‘photographic sameness’ in subsequent episodes.   
 
Any belief or judgement, once made, tends to persevere 
both in the face of new data and after evidential 
discrediting, and rigid adherence to a paradigm is 
typical of scientists (Kuhn, 1970). On the other hand, 
some deluded persons abandon their beliefs as readily 
as they make them (Garety & Hemsley, 1994). 
Scientific/philosophical illuminations, as well as poetic 
creations, often undergo conscious evolution and are 
frequently drafted and re-drafted. Although delusion 
may change, it is more like a leap to another orbit than a 
dialectical movement of thought in a spiral-like fashion.  
 
Particular, Personal and Universal  
Kant (1798/1978) considered that “the only general 
characteristic of insanity is the loss of a sense for 
ideas that are common to all (sensus communis), and 
its replacement with a sense for ideas peculiar to 
ourselves (sensus privatus)” (p. 117). Nearly two 
centuries later, a study comparing poetry written by 
psychotic and non-psychotic poets revealed that the 
theme of self-reference was the only difference on 
eleven dimensions between the two samples (Rhodes 
et al., 1995). The content of delusion is centripetal. It 
is an expression of a private, not shared, world-view 
when a new unconscious association is made between 
the particular and the personal (sometimes wearing a 
mask of the universal – as in Nietzsche’s case). By 
contrast, a scientist builds on achievements of his 
predecessors and contemporaries and, while 
challenging the prevailing paradigm, he remains in a 
dialogue with the scientific community. Scientific 
hypothesis is world-directed and is hinged on the 
cognitive movement from the particular to the 
general, and back. There is an assumed presence of an 
interlocutor/opponent that necessitates symbolic 
communication. Although poetic (and other artistic) 
creations may contain all three elements, the poet 
communicates not by logic, but by evoking a 
resonating ‘feeling state’ in the reader/listener.  
 
Wahnstimmung versus Incubation 
Delusions arise very differently from scientific 
enlightenments. Delusion formation is a process of 
creating a meaning out of a terrifying and puzzling 
experience of a ‘delusional mood’ (Wahnstimmung). 
This state is characterized by a high arousal and an 
alteration of consciousness, which includes a 
disturbed organisation of time (Lewis, 1931); to use 
Hamlet’s metaphor, time is ‘out of joint’. 
Consequently, the personal narrative is broken. In 
mania, the internal tempo is fast but the external time 
seems to pass slowly, and even to come to a halt 
(Tysk, 1984). The all-pervading sense of unreality 
and the blurring of the ‘self-other’ boundary result in 
a profound ‘ontological insecurity’; to adopt the 
perspective of Husserlian phenomenology – there is a 
severe weakening of the synthetic unification of 
mental life. The thinking in Wahnstimmung could be 
likened to an ever-changing kaleidoscope of merging, 
malleable categories with a widening field of 
associations. One modality becomes another so that 
Kantian categories no longer apply; to live in an 
‘uncategorised’ world must be highly anxiety 
provoking – it is an ‘ontological dread’ par 
excellence. A feeling of extraordinary meaningfulness 
ensues, hence Sass’s (1994) talk of an uncanny 
particularity, when “the world of random specifics 
appears in an uncanny light” (p. 106). One feels as if 
one were observing miraculous repetitions and 
coincidences, as if the events that occur correspond to 
some predetermined set of forms with prior existence 
and constitute a part of some purposeful 
consciousness. The vividness of past memories, in a 
moment of disturbed perception of time, acquires an 
almost perceptual quality, and Maher and Ross (1984) 
proposed that a spurious free floating sense of 
significance might lead, through ‘mistaken 
attributions’, to delusions of reference. According to 
Maher (1988), delusion is an attempt of reason (devoid 
of judgement) to deal with an abnormal experience, 
which accords with Schopenhauer’s insight. Jaspers 
(1913/1962) pointed out that no dread was worse than 
that of danger unknown; reaching some definite idea 
must bring a sense of relief as it provides a much-
needed point of reference, an anchor to one’s existence. 
Delusion delivers relief from an unbearable pre-
symbolic dread (Mollon’s term, 2002), or disintegration 
anxiety (Kohut’s term, 1984), or – as Nietzsche would 
have had it – it becomes that life-saving lie.   
 
By contrast, scientific inquiry starts as a problem 
finding a question begging an answer. A genius usually 
requires ten years of conscious preparation (to gather 
information, learn a skill, and so forth) that leads to a 
widening of the associative field. The incubation period 
that follows is largely unconscious, and it involves 
inhibiting the immediate, well-rehearsed responses. 
After a period of suspension, a creative leap takes place, 
often when the conscious attention is diverted to other 
stimuli (Feldman, 1999). Creativity occurs in a state of 
relaxation or reverie: Eureka is not born out of dread. 
Delusion, on the other hand, is not part of a conscious 
quest for an answer to a particular question about the 
world; it delivers an answer without a question being 
asked. Hence delusion is an answer without a question! 
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Discontinuity or Paradigm Shift? 
Kant (1781/1988) revolutionised epistemology by 
asserting that a priori categories in our cognitive process 
are necessary for ordering and making sense of reality. 
We construct the world with our minds (phenomenon) 
and never gain access to the thing-in-itself (noumenon), 
which remains unknowable. Schopenhauer (1819/ 
1969), Kant’s admirer and critic, reduced the original 
number of Kantian categories from twelve to three: 
causality, space and time. A study by Andreasen and 
Powers (1975) has shown that manic psychotic patients, 
as well as creative writers, have a great tendency to 
‘blur, broaden, or shift conceptual boundaries’. In 
epistemology this is known as a paradigm-shift, whilst 
in psychopathology the term ‘over-inclusive thinking’ 
has been coined. Delusion, like a scientific 
enlightenment, is the result of a creative leap when a 
new connection/association is made between the 
previously unrelated. Both are discontinuous with 
previous learning as they abolish the hitherto accepted 
boundaries of a priori categories. A regression, if 
temporary, to the ‘pre-categorical’ mode of thinking is 
necessary in order to create new solutions, whether 
scientific, artistic or psychotic. As does a genius, a 
psychotic demonstrates a considerable degree of 
courage and determination to go against previously 
established conventions. Both are non-conformists! The 
difference lies in the form and the content of a new 
paradigm.  
Signification in Psychosis 
Is there a meaning in psychosis? Meaning implies an 
existence of a referent, an existence of a signifier and 
a signified, and it implies symbolisation. Lacan 
(1968) stressed that the world of psychosis is non-
symbolic; like in a dream there is a regression to 
primary process thinking. The psychotic seems to 
lose the ability to employ what Lévi-Strauss called la 
pensée symbolique, and he lacks the capacity to map 
external reality by placing it on a symbolic 
background. This is in effect a loss of ability to 
intentionalize reality. Lacan, following Freud, talked 
not only of loss but also of substitution of reality in 
psychosis. He referred to this substituted reality as 
metonymic, and this would imply the loss of the 
ability to distinguish the system of signifiers from the 
system of the signified. The ‘as if’ of the 
metaphorical expression is lost and words become 
things or actions. It is as if the semantic values of the 
discourse have regressed to phonemic and eidetic 
qualities, it is as if words had a life of their own. In 
these instances, words form an autonomous message 
with its own sound and visual quality; the signifiers 
become the signified. R. D. Laing (1965) drew 
attention to an almost material actuality of delusional 
creations that acquire a kind of phantom 
concreteness. Andreasen (1976) found that the speech 
of manic patients, as compared with that of those who 
were depressed, contained more concrete nouns, action 
verbs and adjectives.  
Understanding versus Interpretation  
Ununderstandability (Unverständlichkeit) was for 
Jaspers (1913/1962) the hallmark of psychosis. 
Delusions are ununderstandable because they arise 
suddenly, out of context, and it is the psychiatrist who 
decides whether a given belief can or cannot be linked 
meaningfully to the patient’s life. By introducing this 
arbitrary criterion, Jaspers virtually closed the door to 
a psychological inquiry into delusion. 
 
But does psychosis not have traceable psychological 
roots? An early trauma, particularly the loss of a parent, 
has been found to be related to an affective psychosis 
later in life (Brown & Harris, 1978; Klein, 1981). If 
such trauma occurs before the development of the 
logical and verbal ability to deal with it and to 
categorise the experience – it remains inarticulable. 
When, in later life, a constellation of circumstances 
reminiscent of an early trauma recurs, it may trigger 
an avalanche of non-chronological memories, 
carrying with them a physiological state of high 
anxiety and Wahnstimmung. A state of pre-symbolic 
dread overwhelms the person and the ground is laid 
for delusion formation. Not surprisingly, a period of 
severe distress preceding the formation of delusion was 
regularly found among deluded persons (Garety & 
Hemsley, 1994). Could psychosis be a form of 
remembering trauma, albeit an abortive one? Could it 
also be a way of re-living the eternally repressed, a 
Freudian ‘repetition compassion’? 
 
In a ‘de-categorised’ world of psychosis (just as in 
dreams) condensation, displacement and exaggeration 
are at work. The interconnection of ideas and images 
occurs through association, and a collapse of 
chronology and logic is accompanied by a collapse of 
symbolisation and syntax; ‘primary process thinking’ 
renders everything possible. Perhaps delusions should 
be viewed as oneiric thoughts that cannot be 
comprehended by a category-bound logical mode of 
thinking. Hence Freud’s (1900/1955a) hermeneutical 
approach to dreams (Traumdeutung) might be more 
useful here than understanding (Verständnis). Also, 
his method of free association seems particularly 
appropriate when it comes to finding and interpreting 
connections between various emotion-driven states of 
mind. 
 
The Nietzsche Case 
 
As my father I have already died, as my 
mother I still live and grow old. (Nietzsche, 
Ecce Homo) 
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In the early August of 1881, in Sils-Maria (Swiss 
Alps), Nietzsche probably experienced his first manic 
psychotic episode. This was superimposed on an 
introverted cyclothymic personality, complicated by a 
life-long severe recurrent migraine, and by his use of 
opium, marihuana and atropine. Nietzsche’s mood 
swings, which date from his early adulthood, 
continued throughout his life until his final collapse in 
January 1889. This could be substantiated by his own 
descriptions, and also by the evidence of his 
fluctuating creativity pattern (Arbeitskurve), 
accompanied by his equally inconsistent handwriting 
(Cybulska, 2000a). In a letter written at the time to his 
friend Peter Gast, he reported that the “intensity of 
my feelings make me shudder and laugh … on my 
hikes I wept tears of jubilation; I sang and talked 
nonsense, filled with a new vision that puts me ahead 
of men” (Middleton, 1996, p. 178). It was in 
proximity to that episode that the three cardinal ideas 
– which in general seem discontinuous with his 
previous thought – emerged rather suddenly, and 
without any conscious preparation.  
 
Nietzsche was 36 years old at the time, the age his 
father died, and the age he often feared he would die 
too. The father's burial was in early August 1849, 
when Nietzsche was less than five years of age, and 
this was his recollection of the event a decade later: 
                               
When I woke up in the morning I heard all 
around me weeping and sobbing. My dear 
mother came to me with tears and cried out: 
“Oh, God! My good Ludwig is dead 
(todt)1!” … The thought that I would be 
separated forever from the beloved Father 
(den geliebten Vater) seized me, and I wept 
bitterly … . Our pain was horrific 
(ungeheure)2. … On the second of August 
the earthly remains of my father were 
consigned to the womb of the earth. … . At 
one o’clock in the afternoon (Mittag) the 
ceremonies began, with the bells pealing 
their loud knell. Oh, I shall never forget the 
hollow clangour in my ears … (Nietzsche, 
1854-61/1994, Jugendschriften, pp. 4-5) 
 




1 Here Nietzsche uses the word todt that means killed, but 
also dead. In English there is no word denoting killing that 
has the same stem as death. Characteristically, he also uses 
todt in all passages related to Death of God, rather than the 
less ambiguous word gestorben. 
2 I have translated ungeheure as horrific to convey the 
onomatopoeic/physiological effect of the word; the literal 
meaning is monstrous. 
There was another severe loss, perhaps even more 
painful, much closer to the ‘epiphany of Sils-Maria’. 
It gradually dawned on Nietzsche that his attachment 
to Richard Wagner as an idealized paternal figure and 
a kind of archetypal friend had been based on illusion. 
He walked out on their eight-year intense friendship 
in early August 1876 during his visit to Bayreuth, 
feeling betrayed and deeply wounded. Although 
Nietzsche eradicated Wagner from his life, he never 
succeeded in exorcising him from his heart and mind. 
Two of the six books the philosopher wrote in his last 
creative year of 1888 bear Wagner’s name in the title 
(The Wagner Case and Nietzsche contra Wagner), 
and Twilight of the Idols sounds like a mocking echo 
of the final part of The Ring. By Nietzsche’s own 
admission, Wagner was the only man he truly loved; 
an unrequited passion, alas! Early August was a 
fateful time for him, with strong personal 
connotations; it was a period of distress. Professor 
Franz Overbeck, Nietzsche’s most trustworthy and 
reliable confidante, recalled a letter he received from 
the philosopher dated 8 September 1881, “written half 
in German, half in less-than-perfect Latin”, which he 
took for a call of distress. Having observed 
Nietzsche’s violent mood oscillations, and the manner 
in which he had tried to initiate him into his secret 
doctrine, Overbeck concluded that he “was no longer 
a master of his reason” (cited by Klossowski, 1997, p. 
212). 
 
Nietzsche’s Three Cardinal Ideas 
   
The unspeakable strangeness of all my 
problems and illuminations … (Nietzsche, 
A Letter to Overbeck, September 1884) 
 
God is dead (Gott ist todt) is Nietzsche’s most famous 
statement. Although he has become the best known of 
God’s ‘assassins’, he was not the first. Hegel, Heine, 
Feuerbach and Marx had all used an image of a dying 
God. For Nietzsche (1882/1974), however, it acquired 
a special significance: 
 
The madman. Have you not heard of that 
madman who lit a lantern in the bright 
morning hours, ran to the market place, and 
cried incessantly, “I seek God! I seek God!” 
As many of those who did not believe in 
God were standing around just then, he 
provoked much laughter. … The madman 
jumped into their midst and pierced them 
with his eyes. “Whither is God?” he cried. 
“I shall tell you. We have killed him – you 
and I. All of us are his murderers.” … Do 
we hear nothing as yet of the noise of the 
gravediggers who are burying God? Do we 
smell nothing as yet of the divine 
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decomposition? Gods, too, decompose. God 
is dead (todt). God remains dead. And we 
have killed him. … This horrific 
(ungeheure) event is still on its way … . 
(Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 181) 
  
It must be remembered that Nietzsche initially studied 
theology, and intended to follow in his father’s and 
grandfathers’ footsteps and become a Lutheran pastor. 
From a Freudian point of view, Nietzsche’s agonistic 
relationship with God could be seen as a repetition 
compulsion of his oedipal conflict: son wants to 
conquer father in oedipal duel, yet wishes the father 
to survive. But what if the real father dies? The guilt 
can become unbearable, yet its source remains 
consciously unidentifiable. In the vicious circle of 
repetition compulsion, the eternal drama replays itself 
again and again. Nietzsche’s preoccupation with guilt 
and patricide (or ‘theocide’?) is equal to that of 
Dostoyevsky, whom he read and greatly admired. His 
vehement attack on Christianity, which runs through 
most of his oeuvre, can be seen as an act of a pale 
criminal, someone who commits a crime from a sense 
of guilt. The term was used by Dostoevsky (in Crime 
and Punishment), by Nietzsche (in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra), and later by Freud in The Ego and the 
Id. Melanie Klein (1981) suggested that “if guilt is 
too strong, this may lead to turning away from loved 
people or even rejection of them” (p. 321). She also 
believed the feelings of guilt to be a fundamental 
incentive towards creativity and work, which thus 
became a form of reparation. 
Several images coalesce in this awesome phantasm. 
In the recollection of his father’s death Nietzsche says 
the (rather than my) beloved father, a phrase that can 
mean equally father the man and Father our God. He 
uses the words todt (dead) and ungeheure (horrific, 
monstrous) on both occasions, rather like a musical 
leitmotiv; a particular word denotes a particular 
feeling state. The image of the decomposing body of 
Christ is central to Dostoyevsky’s novel The Idiot, a 
book Nietzsche read several years after he had written 
the above fragment. Dostoyevsky visited Basel in 
1867 and was said to have had an epileptic fit after 
seeing Holbein’s painting Dead Christ in the 
Kunstmuseum. This experience was later re-enacted 
by Prince Myshkin, the chief protagonist in the novel. 
Nietzsche, who lived and taught in Basel for a decade, 
was bound to have seen it too. If he had, the image of 
Christ’s decomposing body in the painting would 
have merged with that of the decomposing body of 
his father, thus attaining a profound personal 
significance. Freud (1900/1955a) in his research into 
dreams, dream-work and development of language 
noted that, in ancient languages, the order of the 
sounds in a word can be reversed, while keeping the 
same primordial meaning (which he called the 
antithetical meaning of primal words). Reversing the 
order of words in a sentence could still maintain the 
same primordial meaning – Gott ist todt (God is dead) 
may well mean Todt ist Gott (the Dead is God). Was 
it the decaying body of his father on that August day 
in 1849 that made an indelible impression on the 
mind of a young boy, an impression that could only 
be expressed in psychosis? Did the dead father turn 
into dead God? Was dead God also dead Wagner 
(figuratively speaking) whose alluring music was 
eternally returning to Nietzsche, rather like the hollow 
clangour of funeral bells? 
 
Rage, guilt and despair are often present in the grief 
which follows the death of a loved person, 
particularly when the loss occurs early in life 
(Bowlby, 1969/1985). Nietzsche’s image of dead God 
is imbued with precisely these feelings. They are 
inevitably ambivalent, and Nietzsche’s longing for 
Father/God re-surfaces in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
(1883-85/1969a, p.265): 
    
All the streams of my tears  
Run their course to you! 
And the last flame of my heart –  
It burns up to you! 
Oh come back, 
My unknown God! My pain! My last –   
                                   happiness!  
                                                    
 
The term Übermensch (Overman) was not created by 
Nietzsche, and the concept of hyperanthropos can be 
found in the ancient writings of Lucian. In German, 
the word has been used by H. Müller, J. G. Herder 
and, most importantly, by Goethe in Faust, where a 
spirit scorns the frightened Faust and calls him 
Übermenschen. Again, Nietzsche (1883-85/1969, pp. 
43-45) never explained what he meant by 
Übermensch, only intimated: 
 
Behold, I teach you the Übermensch: he is 
this lightning, he is this madness! 
… 
Behold, I am a prophet of the lightning and 
a heavy drop from  
the cloud: but this lightning is called 
Übermensch. 
                       Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Prologue        
 
Nietzsche had a deeply heroic streak in his soul, and it 
may well have been the heroism that appealed to him 
in the history of the ancient Greeks, in the musical 
dramas of Wagner, in personalities such as Napoleon, 
Julius Caesar, and in the military. Jung (1934-
54/1990) believed that the archetype of a hero is the 
oldest and the most powerful, and considered 
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religious figures such as Buddha, Christ or 
Mohammed to be personifications of such an 
archetype. The element of transformation (or 
resurrection) lies at the heart of the hero’s message. 
The great hero (der Überheld) overcomes himself, 
sublimates his impulses and passions, and owes 
nothing to anyone, not even to God. Nietzsche 
(1886/1990, p. 155) claimed that “in man, creature 
and creator are united”, and he also urged that we 
should fashion our lives in the way artists fashion 
their work, so that we become “the poets of our life”. 
This self-creating hero can be one of the 
interpretations of the Übermensch (Cybulska, 1997). 
But could it also fit Dupré and Logre’s (cited by 
Garety & Hemsley, 1994) concept of a confabulatory 
delusional state where a subjective creation (akin to 
the poetic process) intrudes on reality? Was 
Übermensch a kind of imaginary companion that 
surfaced from the depth of Nietzsche’s unconscious in 
a psychotic moment? Lonely, imaginative and 
sensitive children often invent imaginary companions, 
but such creativity in later life seems to be linked to 
psychosis. Schumann (one of Nietzsche’s most 
beloved composers) invented two imaginary 
characters – exuberant Eusebius and broody Florestan 
– around the time of his first depressive psychotic 
breakdown. (Uncannily, they seem to have 
corresponded with his manic-depressive moods 
swings.) Was Nietzsche’s evocation of Übermensch 
and also Zarathustra (an ancient Persian prophet) 
related to his unconscious preoccupation with the son-
father dyad, a pointer to the Oedipus complex? From 
a Jungian perspective, Übermensch could be 
interpreted as a representation of the whole self in the 
union of the opposites. For Nietzsche (1883-88/1969) 
the greatest being is the one who unites most 
antagonistic traits: “I believe that from the presence 
of opposites and from the feelings they occasion that 
the great man, the bow with the greatest tension, 
develops” (p. 507). He considered such tension to be 
necessary for dynamic creativity, but there was a 
heavy price to be paid; eventually the bow snapped. 
  
Eternal Return of the Same (die ewige Wiederkehr 
des Gleichen) is Nietzsche’s most enigmatic idea. In 
the early August of 1881 in Sils-Maria, 6000 feet 
beyond man and time, the idea suddenly invaded 
Nietzsche’s mind and became central to his thought. 
As he walked down from the woods towards the 
shores of the lake Silvaplana and saw a large 
pyramidal stone, it hit him like lightning. For 
Nietzsche, this Sisyphean scenery seemed to have 
rekindled an image of the ancient infernal hero 
eternally struggling with the greatest weight (das 
grösste Schwergewicht) of guilt and pain, of existence 
itself (Cybulska, 2000b).  
 
In The Gay Science (Nietzsche, 1882/1974, p. 273), 
written soon afterwards, we read:  
 
The greatest weight. – what, if some day or 
night a demon were to steal after you into 
your loneliest loneliness and say to you: 
“This life as you now live it and have lived 
it, you will have to live once more and 
innumerable times more; and there will be 
nothing new in it, but every pain and joy 
and every thought and sigh and everything 
unutterably small or great in your life will 
have to return to you, all in the same 
succession and sequence – even this spider 
and this moonlight between the trees, and 
even this moment and myself. The eternal 
hourglass of existence is turned upside 
down again and again, and you with it, a 
speck of dust!” 
                                                                                               
The cosmogonist idea of Eternal Return was not new 
to the history of human thought (Eliade, 1989), and 
Nietzsche – steeped in classical culture, and 
particularly in pre-Socratic philosophy – would have 
been well acquainted with it. And yet, there must 
have been something extraordinarily unusual, 
compelling, and even frightening in this noon-time 
(Mittags) experience. Indeed, just as Kaufmann  
(1974) intuitively pointed out: “the answer must be 
sought in the fact that the eternal recurrence was to 
Nietzsche less an idea than an experience – the 
supreme experience of a life unusually rich in 
suffering, pain, and agony. He made much of the 
moment when he first had this experience because to 
him it was the moment that redeemed his life” (p. 
323). 
 
It is puzzling why Nietzsche refers directly to his 
most profound idea merely in one passage of The Gay 
Science, in the two passages of Zarathustra (Of the 
Vision and the Riddle and The Convalescent), and 
once in Ecce Homo. He offers no exposition of it in 
his published works, and only in the posthumous 
collection The Will to Power (1883-88/1969) we find 
this reflection: 
 
If the world may be thought of as a certain 
definite quality of force … it follows that, 
in the great dice game of existence, it must 
pass through a calculable number of 
combinations. In infinite time, every 
possible combination would at some time 
be realised; more: it would be realised an 
infinite number of times … . (p. 549)  
                                   
This is a near verbatim quotation from Die letzte 
Gedichte and Gedanken by Heine, one of Nietzsche’s 
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most revered poets. Unlike Heine, however, 
Nietzsche did not apply it as an ironic metaphor and 
often referred to Eternal Return as the “most 
scientific of all ideas”. Yet, he never offered any 
definition, explanation or refutation/verification of 
this doctrine. His intention to study sciences in order 
to prove it never materialised, wiped away by the 
returning waves of elation and melancholia. It is 
rather bizarre that Nietzsche even considered such an 
undertaking in view of his non-existent aptitude for 
mathematics. 
 
Could it be that at the root of this idea was a disturbed 
perception of time in psychosis? Jaspers (1913/1962) 
quotes a psychotic patient: “A frightful pain shot 
through my head and time stood still. At the same 
time it was forced on me in an almost superhuman 
way how vitally important this moment was. Then 
time resumed its previous course, but the time which 
stood still stayed there like a gate” (p. 84). And now 
Nietzsche’s chillingly similar, though incomparably 
more poetic account: 
  
This long lane behind us: it goes on for 
eternity. And that long lane ahead of us — 
that is another eternity. They are in 
opposition to one another, these paths; they 
abut on one another: and it is here at this 
gateway that they come together. The name 
of the gateway is written above it 
“Moment” (“Augenblick”). (Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, III, Of the Vision and the 
Riddle, p. 178) 
 
Another reference to this disturbed sense of time: 
 
What has happened to me? Listen! Has time 
flown away? Do I not fall? Have I not fallen 
– listen! Into the well of eternity? (Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, IV, At Noontide, p.288) 
 
In the Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1955a), Freud 
stressed a complete lack of sense of time both in 
dreams and in psychosis. Perhaps Eternal Return, far 
from being a scientific idea, was an expression of the 
sameness of personal pain and the menacing 
timelessness of psychosis? Perhaps the afternoon 
(Mittags) funeral bells of Nietzsche’s childhood 
returned as a noon-time (Mittags) idea/doctrine on the 
anniversary of his father’s death? 
 
Klossowski (1997), in his imaginative and daring 
book Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, said: “The 
thought of the Eternal Return of the Same came to 
Nietzsche as an abrupt awakening in the midst of a 
Stimmung (mood), a certain tonality of the soul. 
Initially confused with this Stimmung, it gradually 
emerged as a thought; nonetheless, it preserved the 
character of revelation - as a sudden awakening” (p. 
56). He was in no doubt that Nietzsche had perceived 
the thought of Eternal Return, and possibly his other 
thoughts related to that phantasm, as his own 
madness, and it terrified him. Some accounts by 
Nietzsche’s contemporaries, among them Lou Salomé 
(1894/2001), seem to support this: “Unforgettable for 
me are those hours in which he first confided to me 
his secret, whose inevitable fulfilment and validation 
he anticipated with shudders. Only with a quiet voice 
and with all the signs of deepest horror did he speak 
about his secret” (p. 130). Another close friend, Erwin 
Rohde, a famous academic writer, refused to speak of 
Nietzsche’s doctrine as anything other than a 
symptom of his morbid state: “He was surrounded by 
an indescribable atmosphere of strangeness, by 
something that seemed to me to be completely 
uncanny … . It was as though he came from the land 
[where] nobody lives” (from a letter to Overbeck, 
cited by Hollingdale, 1999, p. 172).  
 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud (1920/ 
1955b) adapted Eternal Return as repetition 
compulsion, an expression of an ambivalent impulse 
to act out a repressed experience and at the same time 
to keep it away from consciousness. Could psychosis 
be a form of such repetition compulsion, an 
enactment of painful trauma – vivid, deeply felt, yet 
inarticulable? Or was Eternal Return perhaps for 
Nietzsche a kind of mandala that descended upon him 
in that ‘horrific moment’ of inner terror? Jung 
observed that this archetypal symbol of self 
frequently appeared in the dreams and fantasies of his 
patients at times of serious crisis or loss of 
orientation. It usually had a round or rectangular 
shape end expressed the movement of the self 
towards unity and wholeness; its appearance was 
accompanied by a sense of inner order, balance and 
peace. It was after the emergence of Eternal Return 




Only great pain, the long, slow pain that 
takes its time ... compels us philosophers to 
descend into our ultimate depths ... 
(Nietzsche, The Gay Science) 
 
All three cardinal ideas discussed above emerged 
suddenly, fully formed and without any previous 
deliberation in Nietzsche’s mind. Paradoxically, 
despite his previous knowledge of them, he appeared 
to have conceived them de novo. In neither his 
published nor his unpublished work is there any 
evidence of Nietzsche’s conscious preoccupation with 
these ideas prior to August 1881. Several entries in 
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his private notes (published posthumously as Will to 
Power) were made after the ‘epiphany of Sils-Maria’. 
Whilst a scientist or a philosopher firstly asks a 
question before setting off on a journey of discovery, 
Nietzsche appears to have been trying to find the 
questions after he had already formulated ‘the 
answers’. A philosophical doctrine, being of 
speculative nature, might not need falsification/ 
verification, but it requires definition, exposition and 
elaboration. Whatever these ideas were, they were 
neither scientific theories nor philosophical doctrines; 
to paraphrase Nietzsche – they belonged to an 
indirect biography of his soul. The revelatory nature 
of these dream-thoughts was accompanied by a strong 
feeling of certainty as to their truthfulness and 
importance. On the few occasions that they emerged 
in Nietzsche’s writings, they did so with an almost 
‘photographic sameness’, more like recurring dreams 
(or nightmares?), or musical leitmotifs, than 
philosophical concepts. Their ‘phantom concreteness’ 
is uncanny. After all, were these ideas not, as 
Foucault (1993) would have had it, “arbitrary images 
in a vicious circle of erroneous consciousness” (p. 
104)?    
 
In Ecce Homo, Nietzsche recalled how, at the age of 
thirty-six, he had reached the lowest point of his 
vitality, he talked of his life as being encircled by 
death, and made allusions to Dante’s Inferno. Perhaps 
the ‘epiphany of Sils-Maria’ was nothing other than 
his own descent into the inferno of psychosis, when 
the abyss of pain intersected with the apogee of 
elation – a conjunction that would remain fixed in his 
mind. Moreover, he would crave the return of that 
moment: the more pain, the more victorious elation, 
the more overcoming and sense of will to power. Thus 
the tears of pain were transfigured into the tears of 
jubilation! Melanie Klein (1981) asserts that in mania 
there is “the utilization of the sense of omnipotence 
for the purpose of controlling and mastering objects” 
(p. 277), and this is based on the mechanism of 
denial. This defence mechanism is particularly 
applicable to the lost objects, and mania is often a 
reaction to painful loss and abandonment. In manic-
depressive illness, delusions – particularly of a 
grandiose, religious or philosophical nature – are 
common, and occur in as many as 75% of manic 
episodes (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990). They might 
serve to stabilise a fragile sense of self and have a 
protective function (Neale, 1988). Delusion might be 
best viewed as a kind of ‘reparatory effort’ in the face of 
a breakdown in the temporal synthesis of a psychotic 
experience. Or, as Nietzsche would have had it, that life 
saving lie. He wrote some of his most lucid and 
insightful philosophical works afterwards (e.g. Beyond 
Good and Evil and Of the Genealogy of Morality) and 
enjoyed seven years of great creativity (even if 
interlaced with psychotic moments). The tendency of 
the mind to rescue itself by means of a convincing idea 
from the state of overwhelming anxiety, grief and the 
sense of the unknown, operates not just in psychosis but 
in many sudden abnormal or traumatic occurrences – 
hence the abundance of conspiracy theories that follow 
a tragic event such as the death of Diana, Princess of 
Wales. To accept the unknown and the unknowable, 
and to accept chance and accident, is extremely difficult 
in emotionally charged situations.  
 
The distinction between delusion and poetic creation 
is less clear. Several researchers have reported a high 
prevalence of manic-depressive psychosis amongst 
poets and writers (Jamison, 1993). According to 
Kristeva (1984. p.124), poetry is a return to the 
repressed semiotic in language, through the use of 
rhythms and tones. A regression to the phonemic and 
eidetic qualities of language may well be what a 
psychotic and a poet have in common. Poetic creations 
need neither definition nor verification/falsification. 
Nietzsche’s ideas of Übermensch and God is dead 
certainly have these eidetic phonemic characteristics; 
perhaps this is why Nietzsche has sometimes been 
considered more of a poet than a philosopher. 
 
Jasperian understandability as a criterion for delusion 
can easily become an instrument of alienation. 
Understanding can be applied to things logical, but not 
to music, visual arts, poetry, dreams or psychosis. 
Instead, an associative method underpinned by 
compassion and informed by a detailed knowledge of 
the person’s life (particularly of traumatic events), as 
well as personal connotations, passions and creativity, is 
proposed. The idiosyncrasy of delusion can be more 
adequately grasped by following an associative thread, 
and making sense of delusion would require a 
psychiatrist to look beyond the obvious. Also, enough 
room must be left for the unknown and the unknowable. 
From a scientific point of view, this method, being 
highly intuitive, would remain in essence unfalsifiable. 
    
A disproportionate number of creative achievers lost 
one or both parents in childhood (Eisenstadt, 1978); 
taking into account methodological difficulties in this 
regard, on average such a loss is estimated as three 
times more frequent than in the general population. 
Brown and Harris (1978) observed a link between the 
early loss of a parent and a psychotic illness later in 
life, while Eysenck (1994) pointed out that geniuses 
score highly on psychoticism. While psychoticism – 
through a transient abolition of a categorical 
framework – may facilitate a paradigm shift for a 
scientist as well as a poet, it also has its hidden 
dangers. One can get lost not so much in Jasperian 
untruth, as in the labyrinth of the unconscious. In 
Nietzsche’s case, a reminder of trauma (reaching the 
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age at which his father died, painful disappointment 
in his friendship with Wagner), in the absence of a 
containing relationship or work-affiliation, and 
accompanied by a pre-existing mood disorder, 
triggered a psychosis. There seems to be a link 
between early loss, affective psychosis and 
‘reparative’ creativity. Most of Nietzsche’s writings 
are extremely lucid, contain penetrating psychological, 
cultural, moral and literary insights, and are written in a 
hauntingly beautiful poetic prose of high voltage. 
However, in all probability, the ideas discussed above 
belong to a period of psychosis, an experience as true as 
it was intense. Encircled by death, wounded, and living 
a life of radical solitude, he must have felt compelled to 
express the truth that otherwise would have become 
poisonous. Yet, ultimately, he remained mute. His pain 
and the great sense of loss, while always intensely felt, 
remained at some unspeakable distance. 
 
Shortly before his collapse, Nietzsche penned to a 
friend this Hamletian line:  
 
The gulf has become too great. Ever since, I 
really do nothing anymore but buffooneries 
to remain master over an intolerable tension 
and vulnerability. 
 
This is between us. The rest is silence. 
 
(Letter to Dr. C. Fuchs, 18 July,  




About the Author  
 
Dr Eva M. Cybulska graduated from Gdansk medical school in Poland in the early seventies. She received her 
postgraduate training and further degrees in London, UK. During a long clinical career as a consultant psychiatrist, 
she has applied psychoanalytic understanding to everyday psychiatry, and particularly to psychotic illnesses. Dr 
Cybulska has published many articles in her field, and also a collection of short stories based on the narratives of her 
elderly patients (Old Trees Die Standing, Athena Press, 2006). She has served as a reviewer for professional journals, 
and has lectured on controversial topics to cross-disciplinary audiences drawn from a variety of professions. One of 
her chief interests has been the relationship between mental illness and creativity. Since taking an early retirement a 
few years ago, Dr Cybulska is now devoting her time to reading, writing and travel. 
   
Acknowledgement  
 
I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticism, to the Editor of the IPJP for his patience 






American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (DSM-IV-TR) (4th ed.). 
Washington, DC: APA. 
 
Andreasen, N. J. C., & Powers P. S. (1975). Creativity and psychosis. Archives of General Psychiatry 32, 70-73. 
 
Andreasen, N. J. C. (1976). Linguistic analysis of speech in affective disorders. Archives of General Psychiatry 33, 1361-
1367.  
 
Bowlby, J. (1985). Attachment and loss (Vols. 1-3). London: Penguin Books. (Original work published 1969) 
 
Brown, G. W., & Harris, T. (1978). Social origins of depression. London: Tavistock.  
 
Cybulska, E. M. (1997). Nietzsche: Madness as literature. Psychiatric Bulletin, 21, 510-511. 
 
Cybulska, E. M. (1998). The masks of Nietzsche and eternal return of the repressed. Paper presented at the 6th Annual 
Conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society on Nietzsche: Questions of life and death; philosophy, psychology, 
psychoanalysis held in Manchester, UK, 20-22 September 1996, as reported by U. Nussbaumer-Benz, 
Nietzscheforschung, Akademie Verlag (Ein Jahrbuch) Band 4, 347-357. 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 8, Edition 1   May 2008  Page 11 of 13 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any 
medium without the express permission of the publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
 
Cybulska, E. M. (2000a). The madness of Nietzsche: A misdiagnosis of the millennium? Hospital Medicine. 61(8), 571-
575. 
 
Cybulska, E. M. (2000b). Nietzsche’s eternal return: An illumination or a delusion? Philosophy Now, 29, 16-19.  
 
Danto, A. C. (1965). Nietzsche as philosopher. New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Deleuze, G. (1994). Difference and repetition (P. Patton, Trans.). London: The Athlone Press. 
 
Eisenstadt , J. M. (1978). Parental loss and genius. American Psychologist, 33, 211-223. 
 
Eliade, M. (1989). The myth of eternal return, or cosmos and history (W. R. Trask, Trans.). Middlesex, England: Arcana. 
 
Eysenck, H. (1994). Genius: The natural history of creativity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Feldman, D. H. (1999). The development of creativity. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Handbook of creativity (pp. 169-186). 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Foucault, M. (1993). Madness and civilisation: A history of insanity in the age of reason (R. Howard, Trans.). London: 
Routledge. 
 
Freud, S. (1955a). The interpretation of dreams. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), Standard edition of the complete 
psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vols. 4-5, pp. 1-627). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 
1900) 
 
Freud, S. (1955b). Beyond the pleasure principle. In J. Strachey (Ed. & Trans.), Standard edition of the complete 
psychological works of Sigmund Freud (Vol. 18, pp.1-64). London: Hogarth Press. (Original work published 1920) 
 
Garety, P. A., & Hemsley, D. R. (1994). Delusions: Investigations into the psychology of delusional reasoning. East 
Sussex, U.K: Psychology Press Ltd. 
 
Goodwin, F. K., & Jamison, K. R. (1990). Manic-depressive illness. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.   
 
Heidegger, M. (1984). Nietzsche (D. F. Krell, Trans.) New York: HarperCollins Publishers. (Original work published 
1954) 
  
Heidegger, M. (1977). The word of Nietzsche: ‘God is dead’. In The question concerning technology and other 
essays (W. Lovitt, Trans.). New York: Harper Torchbooks. 
 
Hollingdale, R. J. (1999). Nietzsche: The man and his philosophy. Cambridge U.K: Cambridge University Press.  
 
Jamison, K. R. (1993). Touched with fire.  New York: Free Press.  
 
Jaspers, K. (1962). General psychopathology (J. Hoenig & M. W. Hamilton, Trans.). Manchester: The University Press. 
(Original work published 1913) 
 
Jung, C. G. (1989). Seminars on Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, 2 vols. (J. Jarret, Ed.). London: Routledge. (Original work 
published 1934-1939) 
 
Jung, C. G. (1990). The archetypes and the collective unconscious. In M. Fordham, G. Adler, & W. McGuire (Series 
Eds.), The Collected Works of C. G. Jung (R. F. C. Hull, Trans.), Bollingen Series XX (2nd ed.) (Vol. 9, Part 1). 
London: Routledge. (Original versions of work published 1934-1954) 
  
Kant, I. (1988). Critique of pure reason (J. M. D. Meiklejohn, Trans.). London: Everyman’s Library. I. M. Dent & Sons 
Ltd. (Original work published 1781) 
 
Kant, I. (1978.) Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view (H. H. Rudnick, Ed. & V. L. Dowdell, Trans.). Carbondale 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 8, Edition 1   May 2008  Page 12 of 13 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any 
medium without the express permission of the publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
 
and Edwardville: Southern Illinois University Press. (Original work published 1798) 
 
Kaufmann, W. (1974). Nietzsche: Philosopher, psychologist, antichrist. New Jersey, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Kenny, A. (2007). Knowledge, belief, and faith. Philosophy, 82, 381-397. 
 
Klein, M (1981). Love, guilt and reparation.  London: The Hogarth Press.  
  
Klossowski, P. (1997). Nietzsche and the vicious circle (D. W. Smith, Trans.). London: Athlone Press. 
 
Kierkegaard, S. (1968). Concluding unscientific postscript (D. Swenson & W. Lowrie, Trans.). Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. (Original work published 1846) 
 
Kohut, H. (1984). How does analysis cure? Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Kraepelin E. (1921). Manic-Depressive insanity and paranoia (G. Robertson, Ed. & R. M. Barclay, Trans.). Edinburgh:  
E. & S. Livingstone. (Original work published 1913) 
 
Kristeva, J. (1984). Revolution in poetic language (M. Waller, Trans.). New York: Columbia University Press.  
 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Lacan, L. (1968). The language of the self (A. Wilden, Trans.). New York: Dell Publishing Company.  
 
Laing, R. D. (1965). The divided self: An existential study in sanity and madness. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books 
Ltd.  
 
Lewis, A. (1932). The experience of time in mental disorder. Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine, 25(5), 611-
620. (Original paper presented December 8, 1931) 
 
Maher, B. A., & Ross, J. S. (1984). Delusions. In H. E. Adams & P. Sutker (Eds.), Comprehensive textbook of 
psychopathology (pp. 383-411). New York: Plenum Press. 
 
Maher, B A (1988). Anomalous experience and delusional thinking. In T. F. Oltmanns & B. A. Maher (Eds.), 
Delusional beliefs (pp. 15-33). New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  
 
Middleton, Ch. (Ed. & Trans.). (1996). Selected Letters of Friedrich Nietzsche. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc.  
 
Mollon, P. (2002). Remembering trauma: A psychotherapist’s guide to memory and illusion. London and Philadelphia: 
Whurr Publishers.   
 
Neale, J. M. (1988). Defensive function of manic delusions. In T. F. Oltmanns & B. A. Maher (Eds.), Delusional Beliefs 
(pp. 138-156). New York: Wiley.  
 
Nietzsche, F. (1969a). Thus spoke Zarathustra (R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). London: Penguin Books. (Original work 
published 1883-1885) 
 
Nietzsche, F. (1969b). Will to power (W. Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). New York: Vintage Books. (Original 
work published 1883-1888) 
 
Nietzsche, F. (1974). The gay science (W. Kaufmann, Trans.). New York: Vintage Books. (Original work published 
1882)  
 
Nietzsche, F. (1986a). Ecce homo  (R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.). Middlesex, England: Penguin Books. (Original work 
published 1888) 
Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 8, Edition 1   May 2008  Page 13 of 13 
 
 
The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University’s Faculty 
of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any 
medium without the express permission of the publishers. 
 
The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipjp.org. 
 
 
Nietzsche, F. (1986b). Sämtliche Briefe. Band 8 (Own translation). Kritische Studienausgabe, Band 8.  Berlin: Deutscher 
Taschenbuch Verlag de Gruyter. (Original work published 1887-1889) 
 
Nietzsche, F. (1990). Beyond good and evil (R. J. Hollingdale, Trans.).  London: Penguin Books. (Original work 
published 1886)  
  
Nietzsche, F. (1994). Friedrich Nietzsche Jugendschriften.Band 1 (Own translation). München: Deutschenbuch 
Taschenbuuch Verlag. (Original work published 1854-1861) 
 
Partridge, E. (1963). Origins: A short etymological dictionary of modern English. London: E. Routledge & Kegan 
Paul. 
 
Popper, K. (1959). The logic of scientific discovery. London: Hutchinson. (Original work published 1935) 
 
Rhodes, N., Dowker, A., & Claridge, G. (1995). Subject matter and poetic devices in psychotics’ poetry. British 
Journal of Medical  Psychology, 68, 311-321. 
 
Rogé, J. (1999). Le syndrome de Nietzsche. Paris: Editions Odile Jacob.  
 
Salomé, L. (2001). Nietzsche (S. Mandel, Ed. & Trans.). Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. (Original 
work published 1894) 
  
Sass, L. A. (1994). The paradoxes of delusion.  Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
 
Schain, R. (2001). The legend of Nietzsche’s syphilis. Westport, Connecticut, USA: Greenwood Press. 
  
Schopenhauer, A. (1969). The world as will and representation (E. F. Payne, Trans.). New York: Dover Publications, 
Inc. (Original work published 1819) 
 
Soanes, C. (Ed.). (2006). Oxford English Dictionary (11th rev. ed.). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.  
 
Spitzer, M. (1990). On defining delusions. Comprehensive Psychiatry, 31, 377-397.  
 
Tysk, L. (1984). Time perception and affective disorders. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 58, 455-464. 
 
Wood, D. (1988). Nietzsche’s transvaluation of time. In D. Wood & D. F.  Krell (Eds.), Exceedingly Nietzsche (pp. 31-
62). London and New York: Routledge.   
 
 
 
_____________________ 
